Add Results.tex for baseline profile

main.tex

@@ -232,20 +232,27 @@ and Management}} % Your department's name and URL, this is used in
 \begin{abstract}
   \addchaptertocentry{\abstractname} % Add the abstract to the table of contents
 
-  This thesis benchmarks peer-to-peer mesh VPNs using a reproducible,
-  Nix-based framework built with a deployment system called Clan. We
-  evaluate ten VPN implementations; including Tailscale (via
-  Headscale), Hyprspace, Nebula, Tinc, and ZeroTier; under four
-  network impairment profiles varying packet loss, reordering,
-  latency, and jitter, yielding over 300 unique measurements across
-  seven benchmarks.
+  This thesis evaluates ten peer-to-peer mesh VPN implementations
+  under controlled network conditions using a reproducible, Nix-based
+  benchmarking framework built on a deployment system called Clan.
+  The implementations range from kernel-level protocols (WireGuard,
+  used as a reference baseline) to userspace overlays (Tinc,
+  Yggdrasil, Nebula, Hyprspace, and others).  We test each against
+  four impairment profiles that vary packet loss, reordering, latency,
+  and jitter, producing over 300 measurements across seven benchmarks
+  from raw TCP and UDP throughput to video streaming and
+  application-level downloads.
 
-  Our analysis reveals that Tailscale outperforms the Linux kernel's
-  default networking stack under degraded conditions, owing to its
-  userspace IP stack with tuned parameters. We confirm this by
-  re-running benchmarks with matching kernel-side tuning and observe
-  comparable throughput gains. The investigation also uncovered a
-  critical security vulnerability in one of the evaluated VPNs.
+  A central finding is that no single metric captures VPN performance:
+  the rankings shift depending on whether one measures throughput,
+  latency, retransmit behavior, or application-level transfer time.
+  Under network impairment, Tailscale (via Headscale) outperforms the
+  Linux kernel's default networking stack, an anomaly we trace to its
+  userspace IP stack's tuned congestion-control and buffer parameters.
+  Re-running the internal baseline with matching kernel-side tuning
+  closes the gap, confirming the explanation.  The accompanying source
+  code analysis uncovered a critical security vulnerability in one of
+  the evaluated implementations.
 
 \end{abstract}